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ABSTRACT 
The study of metacognition is rooted in the observation of behaviors under states of 
uncertainty (e.g., Smith et al., 1995). Individuals who are more responsive to uncertainty tend to 
show greater interference effects in a Stroop color-word naming task compared to those who are 
less responsive to uncertainty (Washburn, Smith, & Taglialatela, 2005). Individual differences in 
Stroop interference also have been shown to reflect relative differences in response competition 
(Washburn, 1994) and rule-maintenance ability (Kane & Engle, 2003). Why would individuals 
who respond to uncertainty most adaptively be characterized by the worst attention-control 
skills? The current study was designed to measure the individual contribution of sensitivity to 
response competition and rule maintenance ability to the pre-established relationship between 
Stroop interference and uncertainty responsiveness. Though participants performed as expected 
in both tasks, the previously reported relationship between Stroop interference and uncertainty 
responsiveness was not observed.  
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1 INTRODUCTION  
Humans—and almost certainly other animals—experience doubt. The capacity to monitor 
and respond to the experience of uncertainty serves as a focus of the empirical investigation of 
metacognition in humans and in nonhuman animals (Smith et al., 1995; Smith, Shields, Schull, 
& Washburn, 1997; Smith, Shields, & Washburn, 2003). Metacognition is cognition about 
cognition, or the complex ability of an individual to monitor and to control mental states (Flavell, 
1979; Nelson & Narens, 1990; Smith et al., 1995). Metacognition is said to be one of the most 
sophisticated abilities of human cognition (Smith, 2010). It is used to allocate and to direct 
cognitive resources adaptively, allowing metacognitive individuals to respond not only to the 
states of objects, but also to mental states in relation to objects (e.g., Smith et al., 1995; Smith et 
al., 1997). In human adults, metacognition is also a self-reflective mechanism that is 
introspective and declarative, demonstrating conscious awareness of mental states (Flavell, 1979; 
Koriat, 2007; Metcalfe & Schwartz, 2016).  
Metacognition involves two conceptually distinct components: monitoring and control 
(Nelson & Narens, 1990). In monitoring, the metacognitive executive forms appraisals of mental 
states. In control, appraisals of mental states inform lower-level cognitive processes and guide 
behaviors that follow. For example, the metacognitive executive is active when we decide to 
reread a paragraph. Monitoring of mental states allows people to judge whether they have 
understood the passage to a satisfactory degree and control of cognition directs them to reread 
the passage with more focused attention. Metacognitive abilities are instrumental in a multitude 
of tasks, ranging from the contemplation of the very nature of human existence and experience to 
deciding whether or not to jump to a distant branch.  
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Metacognition has been examined through the use of several different methodologies, 
including confidence judgments (e.g., Kornell, Rhodes, Castel, & Tauber, 2011; Roebers, 2002; 
Shields, Smith, Guttmannova, & Washburn, 2005), observations of information seeking 
behaviors (e.g., Beran et al., 2015; Crystal & Foote, 2011; Neldner, Collier-Baker, & Nielsen, 
2015), and the use of an uncertain response (e.g., Smith, et al., 1995; Smith, et al., 1997; Smith et 
al., 2003). With the latter paradigm, human adults (Smith et al., 1995; Smith et al., 1997), young 
children (Beran, Decker, Schwartz, & Smith, 2012), dolphins (Smith et al., 1995) rhesus 
monkeys (Shields et al., 2005; Shields, Smith, & Washburn, 1997; Smith, Beran, Redford, & 
Washburn, 2006; Smith, Coutinho, Church, & Beran, 2013; Smith, Redford, Beran, & 
Washburn, 2009; Smith et al., 1997; Washburn, Smith, & Shields, 2006; Zakrzewski et al., 2014) 
and some capuchin monkeys (Beran, Perdue, & Smith, 2014; Beran, Pedue, Church, & Smith, 
2016; Beran et al., 2009) have demonstrated the capacity—at least under some circumstances—
to respond adaptively to their own mental states.  
Experiments employing the uncertain response paradigm have provided insight into the 
relationships between metacognition and other cognitive mechanisms, such as working memory 
(e.g., Coutinho et al., 2015; Smith et al., 2013) and executive attention (Washburn et al., 2005). 
Results from these studies serve to inform the interpretation of observed individual and species 
differences in responsiveness to uncertainty (Smith et al., 2003). Further investigation into the 
individual differences present in uncertainty responsiveness will provide additional insight into 
the nature of uncertainty and metacognition.  
1.1 The Uncertain Response 
Researchers have investigated metacognition through observations of behaviors under 
states of uncertainty (Smith et al., 2003; Zakrewski et al., 2014). In early psychophysical 
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discrimination tasks, some psychologists allowed respondents to indicate uncertainty when faced 
with difficult trials (e.g., George, 1917). However, these responses were believed to be 
psychologically distinct from the stimulus-based primary responses in which the researchers of 
the time were most interested (Watson, Kellogg, Kawanishi, & Lucas, 1973). Researchers 
worried that uncertain responses were subject to individual differences of attitude, lapses of 
attention, or even failure of instruction on the part of the experimenter (George, 1917). For these 
reasons, some researchers recommended disallowing the avoidance of difficult trials by adopting 
forced-choice paradigms (Brown, 1910).  
For the researchers who were interested in the appraisal and response to uncertainty itself, 
most testing paradigms relied on participant self-report in the form of, among other things, 
judgments of learning or feelings of knowing (see Schwartz, 1994), or the recalling of tip-of-the-
tongue experiences (Brown & McNeill, 1966; Schwartz & Metcalfe, 2011). Due to the linguistic 
nature of these paradigms, metacognition research was not yet sensitive to the developmental 
study of uncertainty monitoring (Acredolo & O'Connor, 1991) and was completely exclusionary 
to the comparative study of uncertainty monitoring (Smith et al., 1995). These limitations called 
for a new approach: the repurposing of the uncertain response.  
Smith and collaborators (1995) developed a psychophysical discrimination task that 
allowed for individuals to use a third response to avoid loss from incorrect responses (but also 
forego possible maximum reward for correct responses) as a nonverbal behavioral proxy for the 
monitoring and responding to states of uncertainty. Maximizing reward required participants 
effectively to monitor and respond to uncertainty. The psychophysical uncertainty response 
paradigm was initially created with cross-species comparative research in mind. Among the first 
nonhuman animal participants was Natua, a bottlenose dolphin (Smith et al., 1995). Natua’s 
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performance and subsequent report on his performance on the uncertainty task is credited as the 
introduction to the study of nonhuman animal metacognition (Smith, 2010).   
Smith and his collaborators tested Natua and five human participants in an auditory 
threshold discrimination task (Smith et al., 1995). Each of the six participants was required to 
determine whether the frequency of an auditory stimulus was exactly 2,100 Hz (high tone/target-
present), or less than 2,100 Hz (1,200 Hz to 2,099 Hz, low tone/target-absent). For humans, 
correct responses were indicated by a reward sound and a one-point increase in an on-screen 
“correct answer” tally. For Natua, correct responses were rewarded with a food reward and 
praise from a human experimenter.  
Trial difficulty was modified dynamically according to response accuracy: correct 
responsiveness led to more difficult trials and incorrect responsiveness resulted in less difficult 
trials (Smith et al., 1995). Trial difficulty increased by narrowing the gap between the target-
present and target-absent levels. Differences between categories became less discriminable as 
“target-absent” frequencies approached 2,100 Hz. Experimenters maintained response accuracy 
at near-chance levels with this difficulty titration, meaning that it was possible to track when 
Natua was unable to discriminate the tones. The dynamic modification of difficulty adapted for 
within-participant differences in performance across trials. These within-participant differences 
may include changes in motivation, effects of practice or fatigue, or even temperamental changes 
as warned by the early psychophysicists. If Natua, for whatever reason, was suddenly to become 
a more astute perceiver, trial difficulty would ramp up to accommodate his new perceptual 
threshold.  
The critical and distinguishing feature of the uncertainty paradigm was that participants 
were allowed a third, non-categorical option to escape and advance any trial (Smith et al., 1995). 
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When selected, this third response skipped the current trial and presented a guaranteed-win trial 
as the next trial. To dissuade excessive use of this escape response, experimenters included a 
timeout period that compounded along with increased use of this escape response. Escaping 
several trials in a row would lead to larger and larger penalties. The optimal response pattern to 
maximize reward and minimize cost in the form of penalties from errors and excessive escaping 
would require individuals to rely on the primary discrimination as often as possible. The escape 
response would have to be used, but reserved for only the most difficult trials – when the 
individual decided that the stimulus class was indeterminable.  
Natua and the human participants used the uncertain response adaptively, generally 
saving it for the empirically uncertain trials only (Smith et al., 1995). Researchers also took note 
of behavioral markers that appeared to distinguish Natua’s approach to the uncertain response 
from the primary responses. Uncertain responses were often chosen with hesitation, wavering, 
and rhythmic motions such as mouth movements or swaying between response options.  
Around the same time, researchers tasked human participants and two rhesus macaques 
with a visual analog of the auditory threshold discrimination task (Smith et al., 1997). Rhesus 
monkeys Abel and Baker and 14 humans were required to judge whether a frame contained 
either exactly 2,950 illuminated pixels (target-present/dense), or 450 to 2,949 pixels (target-
absent/sparse). Correct responses by human participants were rewarded with a tone and an 
increase in an on-screen money counter. Incorrect responses were followed by a buzzing noise 
and a decrease in the money counter. Correct responses by monkeys were rewarded with food 
pellets and a reward tone. Incorrect responses were followed by a buzz and a timeout period. 
Half of the trials presented in the task were target present, 14% of the trials were set to the lowest 
level of target absent (450 illuminated pixels), and the remaining 36% of trials were modified 
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dynamically according to response accuracy in the most recent 10 trials. In a second task, Abel, 
Baker, and 18 undergraduate students were required to categorize pixel density as dense or 
sparse along a continuum. Densities from 334 to 577 pixels were to be assigned as sparse, and 
densities from 599 to 1,034 were to be assigned as dense. Here, density levels were randomly 
selected across the entire range.  
In both tasks, Baker and human participants used the uncertain response adaptively when 
faced with difficult discriminations (Smith et al., 1997). Abel also showed a human-like pattern 
of responses in Experiment 1. In the second task, Abel demonstrated considerable difficulty in 
using the escape response optimally—but there too, his performance was mirrored by one human 
respondent in that same study. Results from all three species (dolphin, rhesus monkey, and 
human) demonstrated a remarkably similar strategic approach to avoiding difficult trials.  
1.2 The Psychology of the Uncertain Response 
Though early psychologists believed “doubtful” responses to be psychologically distinct 
from the primary categorical responses, the interpretation of the uncertain response in the 
psychophysical discrimination paradigm continues to be contentious (Beran, & Smith, 2014; 
Couchman, Coutinho, Beran, & Smith, 2010; Hampton, 2009; Kornell, 2014; Smith, Beran, 
Couchman, & Coutinho, 2008; Smith, Couchman, & Beran, 2014). As a result, comparative 
researchers have endeavored to find experimental evidence of a distinction between categorical 
responses and uncertain responses. Modifications to the psychophysical paradigm with human 
and nonhuman subjects have served to address these alternative accounts, the last decade of 
which are described below. 
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1.2.1 Generalization and Flexibility of the Uncertain Response 
One behavioral distinction between uncertainty responding and primary categorical 
responses and their cues was found with the immediate generalization of the escape response by 
rhesus monkeys running multiple discrimination tasks (Washburn et al., 2006). Rhesus monkeys 
were presented with a familiar two-choice discrimination task. Novel stimulus pairs were 
randomly generated by computer software and repeated for six trials per problem. One of the two 
stimuli was randomly selected as the correct response, the selection of which would be positively 
reinforced. Because of the random generation and selection of correct answers, it was impossible 
for individuals to know which of the two stimuli to choose on the first trial of the six trial block. 
The monkeys were allowed to select an escape option that would remove the incorrect response 
from the screen. The participants were significantly more likely to use the escape response on the 
first trial of each block, when they could not perform about chance levels.  
These same rhesus monkeys then completed a matching-to-sample task in which the 
sample and match were left-right mirror images of each other 25% of the time – a difficult task 
for a rhesus monkey (Washburn et al., 2006). Three of the four monkeys selected the escape 
response on the very first mirror-image trial, and all four animals used the uncertain response 
significantly more often on the mirror-image trials than on other matching-to-sample trials. The 
authors concluded that the instant generalization of the uncertain response provided evidence that 
the response is psychologically distinct from the primary response options.  
Similarly, rhesus macaques quickly and flexibly used the escape response as category 
parameters shifted across testing sessions (Beran, Smith, Redford, & Washburn, 2006). In this 
experiment, participants were required to judge whether a presented array of circles was either 
more or less numerous than a randomly chosen center point – another fairly difficult task for the 
8 
monkeys. Participants demonstrated not only adaptive use of the escape response in the task, but 
also the ability to use the response flexibly while response categories were recalibrated across 
testing sessions. Further, the monkeys exhibited use of the uncertain response even though it was 
not rewarded directly through primary reinforcement, or through secondary reinforcements such 
as simpler subsequent trials or guaranteed-win trials.  
To dissociate uncertainty responses from primary reinforcement further, researchers 
presented humans and rhesus macaques with a psychophysical discrimination task with deferred 
trial feedback (Smith et al., 2006). In these experiments, participants completed a block of trials 
before any feedback was given. After four trials for monkeys or eight trials for humans, feedback 
was arranged according to feedback type – correct response feedback was presented first, then 
incorrect responses. That is, if participants answered 4 trials correctly then 2 trials incorrectly 
then 2 trials correctly within a block, the feedback would be presented as 6 reinforcement tones 
(and pellets for the monkeys), then two buzzers and timeouts. The uncertain response in these 
tasks received no feedback. This feedback blocking and reordering made it virtually impossible 
for participants to track per-stimulus associations between each stimulus, the response made to it, 
and the specific feedback given for that response. Regardless, humans and one of the two 
monkeys showed adaptive use of the escape response even when its use was decoupled from its 
result.  
Along with generalization, humans and rhesus monkeys demonstrated flexible criteria for 
use of the uncertain response. Zakrzewski et al. (2014) and colleagues presented human and 
rhesus monkey participants with a sparse-dense discrimination task requiring subjects to 
categorize stimuli. Correct responses for both species were rewarded with an increase on an on-
screen token bank. Incorrect responses emptied this bank. Here, the third option served as a 
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“cash out” function that either assigned the accumulated tokens to an overall point total or 
delivered food pellets. The third option included a short timeout cost to discourage participants 
from simply claiming the earnings after every correct response. The third option did not, 
however, escape the current trial in any way. Thus, the utility of the uncertain response was not 
to avoid difficult trials, but to avoid gambling the bank’s holdings when stimuli were 
indiscriminable. The humans and rhesus monkeys demonstrated flexible use of the uncertain 
response by assessing risk dynamically according to the difficulty of the presented trial and the 
number of tokens gambled in the trial. For rhesus monkeys, this result served further to 
dissociate the uncertain response from aversion-avoidance accounts of uncertainty responding. 
The monkeys used the cash-out response more liberally on difficult trials when more reward was 
at stake. Thus, it was not enough to know the objective difficulty of the trial or the amount of 
reward at risk to predict uncertainty responding – one had to know both to make the best 
prediction. 
1.2.2 Cognitive Dissociations from Middle Category Responses 
Theorists have previously discussed the psychological distinction between middle 
category responses and “doubtful” responses in human psychophysics (Fernberger, 1930; 
George, 1917; Watson et al., 1973). To examine these differences in the context of the uncertain 
response, participants have been given psychophysical discrimination tasks in which the third 
option served as either a middle category, or an escape response. 
One such behavioral dissociation of uncertain and middle category responses was 
observed in the first use of the uncertain response paradigm with capuchin monkeys (Beran et 
al., 2009). In the first task of the experiment, the monkeys were presented with a sparse-dense-
uncertain task similar to the ones previously described. The escape response was met with no 
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direct feedback and simply advanced the task to the next trial. The experimenters encouraged the 
use of the escape response several ways. Experimenters increased timeout penalties for incorrect 
responses, increased overall difficulty by oversampling densities in the middle range of the 
continuum, presented trials where primary response options were disabled and only the escape 
response advanced to the next trial, and followed the escape response with a much simpler 
discrimination trial afterward. In a second task, monkeys were presented with a similar sparse-
dense discrimination task, but in this case, the middle response was treated as a third category 
option and was rewarded when selected specifically in the presence of stimuli from the middle 
region of the density continuum. Task order was counterbalanced so that three of the six 
monkeys completed the uncertain task first, then the middle category task and vice versa. In 
these tasks, regardless of order, capuchin monkeys did not show adaptive use of the escape 
response (or much use of the escape response at all), but quickly adopted the third option when it 
behaved like a middle category response.  
In Experiment 2 of the study (Beran et al., 2009), researchers considered whether the 
capuchins simply avoided the uncertain response because of the amount of overall reinforcement 
received through continued primary responding – regardless of how uncertain they may have 
been. To balance the reinforcement landscape, experimenters modified the uncertain task to 
include much steeper penalties than the middle category task. Regardless, five of the six 
monkeys still did not use the escape response adaptively, confirming that the uncertain response 
was indeed being avoided specifically, unlike the middle category response.  
One capuchin named Logan demonstrated use of the escape response comparable to 
rhesus monkeys in the very final block of his testing (Beran et al., 2009). The researchers 
interpreted the result cautiously as an indication that the capuchin monkeys perhaps do have the 
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capacity to use the escape response adaptively, but do not do so for some undetermined reason 
(see Beran et al., 2014; Smith et al., 2009). However, the authors concluded that the stark 
difference in overall use between the middle category response and the uncertain response points 
to a difference in the psychological nature of the responses. The middle response was a primary 
perceptual response on the same grounding as the sparse and dense options, whereas the 
uncertain response occupied a different class.  
Zakrzewski and collaborators reported a similar distinction between uncertain and middle 
category responses in human adults (Zakrzewski et al., 2014). Human participants were 
randomly assigned to one of two tasks. The first, a sparse-dense discrimination task included the 
uncertain response as a third option. The uncertain response had no effect other than to advance 
to the next trial. The second task also required categorization along a density continuum, but just 
as the previously described experiment, the third option assigned stimuli to a middle category. 
That is, the second task differed from the first in that it contained three primary categorical 
responses instead of two categorical responses and an escape response. After a training session, 
all participants received two blocks of (counterbalanced) testing. In one condition, participants 
were bound to a 500 ms response window. The second condition was unbound by time restraint.  
Researchers found that uncertain responses, unlike middle category responses, were particularly 
sensitive to time restraints. When faced with the time limit, uncertain responses dropped 
significantly. These results suggest that uncertain responses require a more controlled, and 
therefore time consuming, decisional computation than primary categorical responses. 
1.2.3 Ancillary Behaviors and Post-hoc Accounts 
As previously mentioned, researchers took note of Natua’s hesitation and wavering when 
selecting the escape response – behaviors that they did not see when Natua chose one of the two 
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primary response categories (Smith et. al, 1995; Smith, 2010). The researchers noted that these 
behaviors could potentially be used to operationalize feelings of uncertainty, though most use of 
the uncertainty paradigm does not involve additional behavioral observation.  Generally 
however, humans and monkeys do not exhibit increased response latencies when choosing to 
escape rather than make one of the primary response options (Shields et al., 1997). In this 
experiment (Shields et al., 1997), one group of human participants was deliberately not 
instructed on how to use the escape response. Regardless, these participants demonstrated 
adaptive use of the escape response to avoid difficult trials. Post-experimental interviews with 
these individuals revealed that 23 of the 25 participants who were asked about their use of the 
escape response attributed it to subjective feelings of doubt, in contrast with the primary 
response options that were attributed to judgments of stimulus conditions. That is, the use of the 
uncertain response was in reaction to a mental state – not stimuli themselves. These reports also 
recall the intuitions of the early psychophysicists who judged “doubtful” reports as more 
cognitive in nature than the primary discrimination responses. The post-hoc accounts support the 
idea that the escape response is indeed a behavioral proxy for uncertainty, at least for humans. 
1.2.4 Working Memory and the Uncertain Response 
Another demonstration of the distinctly cognitive nature of the uncertain response was 
conducted with rhesus monkeys. Smith and collaborators presented rhesus monkeys with sparse-
dense discrimination tasks that included either a middle category or an uncertain response (Smith 
et al., 2013). In the first two experiments, participants completed blocks of either alternating or 
concurrent memory tasks. In the alternating blocks, monkeys would complete a trial of a 
matching-to-sample (Experiment 1) or spatial memory task (Experiment 2), then a trial of the 
sparse-dense task. In the concurrent blocks, monkeys would be presented with a stimulus, then 
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would be required to hold the stimulus in memory until after the completion of a trial of the 
sparse-dense discrimination that included the uncertain response as a third option. In Experiment 
3, monkeys were given alternating or concurrent blocks of the same matching-to-sample task, 
but with a middle category option instead of an uncertain response. When faced with concurrent 
cognitive load, uncertainty responding decreased dramatically. The primary categorical 
responses, however, were not affected by the concurrent memory task. Experiment 3 
demonstrated that middle category responding, though slightly disturbed in one individual, was 
not as vulnerable to the increased demands on working memory in the concurrent blocks.  
In a similar set of experiments, human participants demonstrated a comparable pattern of 
decreased uncertainty responsiveness under working memory load (Coutinho et al., 2015). 
However, after extensive training, human participants used the uncertain response as often as the 
middle category response. This result contrasts with the previous study, given that the rhesus 
monkeys were provided with a considerable number of trials to familiarize themselves with task 
demands. Coutinho et al. (2015) reasoned that the process of uncertainty monitoring became 
automatized after extended practice in humans. That is, the participants either were able to 
decrease the cognitive load inherent to uncertainty monitoring through practice, or were more 
inclined to allocate resources to monitoring once convinced of the utility of the escape response. 
Under this view, individuals who had less cognitive resources available to allocate, such as 
rhesus monkeys, would be less likely to increase uncertainty responsiveness through training. 
1.2.5 Individual Differences in Uncertainty Responding 
Large individual differences have been observed within and across species in uncertainty 
responding across psychophysical discrimination tasks (e.g., Paul, Boomer, Smith, & Ashby, 
2011; Smith et. al, 1997). Thomson (1920) noted that “undecided” responses were dependent on 
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an individual’s decision-forming habits, as opposed to actual sensitivity to stimulus conditions. 
Other researchers have discussed an orientation toward uncertainty as a trait of personality 
(Shuper et al., 2004).  
Washburn et al. (2005) compared performance on a psychophysical uncertainty paradigm 
with a battery of assessments of personality traits, dispositional traits, and attention abilities. The 
authors found several correlates to more optimal use of the uncertainty response. First, they 
found that women used the uncertain response more than men. In addition, more optimal 
respondents reported fewer attention-deficit symptoms than less optimal respondents. These 
same relatively optimal respondents, however, reported experiencing more frequent errors of 
attention in a Cognitive Failures Questionnaire (Broadbent, Cooper, FitzGerald, & Parkes, 1982). 
Washburn et al. reasoned that the self-assessment of attention ability is a metacognitive act in 
itself, and that it would be reasonable to expect that individuals who are more sensitive to their 
attention constraints would also be more responsive to uncertainty. Optimal uncertainty 
responsiveness was correlated with self-reported Need for Closure (Webster & Kruglanski, 
1994), and more specifically, a subscale that included items indicating a dislike for 
unpredictability. Similarly, more optimal respondents were also more likely to report a dislike of 
uncertainty in a Personal Need for Structure subscale measure (Neuberg & Newsom, 1993). 
However, these dispositional correlates did not ultimately account for much of the variance in 
uncertainty responding overall.  
Beyond the self-report measures, Washburn et al. (2005) also compared performance on 
the psychophysical uncertainty task to three objective attention measures, including a visual 
search task, an attention cuing task, and a Stroop color-word task. In the visual search task, the 
most optimally uncertain-responding participants were more efficient in identifying targets. The 
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authors reported no relationship between the attention cuing task and uncertainty responding. 
Washburn, et al. (2005) also found that participants who responded more optimally to 
uncertainty tended to experience the largest interference effects from incongruent trials in the 
Stroop color-word task. That is, individuals who performed worse on the Stroop task tended to 
perform more optimally on the psychophysical discrimination task.  
1.3 Stroop Interference 
The Stroop task has been referred to as the “gold-standard” of attention measures 
(MacLeod, 1992). Across variants, participants are asked to respond to a property of a stimulus 
(e.g., color, quantity, spatial location). When presented simultaneously with a conflicting and 
prepotent cue, such as a contrary color-word meaning, participants require more time to respond 
and are more prone to error (MacLeod, 1991; Stroop, 1935). The capacity quickly and accurately 
to resolve conflict on Stroop-like tasks has been used to indicate attention deficits and individual 
(and group) differences in cognitive control (Fan et al., 2002; Osimani, Alon, Berger, & 
Abarbanel, 1997; Washburn & Putney, 1999). Nonhuman primates exhibit Stroop interference 
effects (Beran, Washburn, & Rumbaugh, 2007) and demonstrate greater Stroop-like effects than 
do human adults (Washburn, 1994, 2016). On one account, performance on Stroop tasks requires 
the resolution of response competition per-trial and the sustained maintenance of task goals 
across trials (Kane & Engle, 2003). The contributions of these factors can be indicated through 
task manipulations, including changes in the semantic incongruity of per-trial stimuli (e.g., 
Klein, 1964; Washburn, 1994) and the ratio of congruent to incongruent trials presented in 
testing blocks (e.g., Hutchinson, 2011; Kane & Engle, 2003). 
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1.3.1 Stroop Interference and Rule Maintenance 
Kane and Engle (2003) tested undergraduate volunteers on a complex span test of 
working memory capacity, and used performance to divide groups into high- versus low-span. 
They reported that low-working memory span individuals experienced greater interference in 
response accuracy when incongruent trials were uncommon, that is, when the proportion of 
congruent-Stroop trials was very high. Continued accurate and efficient responding in Stroop 
tasks requires participants to maintain and monitor task rules (i.e., “respond to print color, not 
word meaning”) throughout testing blocks. Unlike congruent or baseline trials, Kane and Engle 
reasoned that incongruent trials served to remind participants of task goals. When cues in the 
form of incongruent trials are uncommon, monitoring of task rules creates an increased demand 
on working memory. Low-working memory span participants were more likely to err when 
required actively to maintain and monitor task rules without the cuing provided by the 
incongruent trials. Although both low- and high-span participants experienced strong 
interference effects when incongruent trials were most common, low-span participants required 
significantly more time to respond in these blocks. High- and low-span participants did not differ 
in accuracy in the high-incongruent ratio blocks, where all of the incongruous trials served as 
objective reminders of the rules for the task.  
The result was replicated in both accuracy and response times in humans (Hutchison, 
2011) and monkeys (Washburn, 2016). Hutchinson (2011) compared item-specific and listwide 
sources of Stroop interference and working memory capacity. Results indicated that low-span 
individuals required more time and were more prone to error than high-span individuals when 
congruent trials were most common, regardless of item-specific factors. Interference effects were 
more likely to be observed in the form of increased response times when low-span participants 
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were recently reminded of the task rule with the presentation of an incongruent trial. Conversely, 
interference effects were more likely to be seen in response accuracy when low-span participants 
were not recently cued with an incongruent trial. Hutchinson concluded that the results supported 
Kane and Engle's (2003) account of Stroop task performance requiring participants to actively 
maintain task rules along with the resolution of response competition. 
Similar effects also were observed with rhesus monkeys using a numerical Stroop task 
(Washburn, 2016). In this numerical Stroop task, participants were required to judge which of 
two numerical arrays was more numerous, regardless of the symbolic value of the numerical 
symbols composing the arrays. Humans and monkeys demonstrated Stroop interference effects 
when the more numerous of the two arrays was populated with symbols of lower symbolic 
values (Washburn, 1994; 2016). Data from both reports showed that rhesus monkeys 
experienced greater effects of Stroop interference than humans. Washburn (2016) reported that 
rhesus monkeys presented with high-congruous ratio blocks of numerical Stroop mimicked the 
results of low-span humans. These monkeys were unable to curb the increased interference 
effects when incentivized with greater rewards. 
To summarize these studies, lower working memory capacity, and thus attention-control 
and rule-maintenance deficits, is associated with relatively larger Stroop-interference effects 
(Hutchison, 2011; Kane & Engle, 2003; Washburn, 2016). Moreover, increases in working 
memory load (which effectively decreases working-memory capacity) have been shown to 
reduce the use of the uncertain response in humans and rhesus monkeys (Coutinho et al., 2015; 
Smith et al., 2013). These results suggest that individuals who experience greater Stroop-
interference effects (i.e., individuals with higher working memory capacity and rule maintenance 
ability) would be less responsive to uncertainty. With extended practice, humans are able to use 
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the uncertain response adaptively despite concurrent task demands, whereas rhesus monkeys 
cannot (Coutinho et al., 2015). This species differences is said to be due to the increased working 
memory capacity available to humans, which provides resources for metacognitive monitoring 
even under demanding task situations. For this reason, it can be reasonably expected that 
individuals within a species with access to more controlled-attention resources (i.e., individuals 
with higher working memory capacity and rule maintenance ability) would be more responsive 
to uncertainty. However, individuals who experience greater Stroop interference effects tend to 
be more responsive to uncertainty (Washburn et al., 2005).  
This result makes sense if, for example, individuals who experience the response conflict 
of Stroop more vividly or more metacognitively are also those individuals most sensitive to the 
conflict that characterizes uncertainty in a metacognitive task. However, the pattern of results 
would suggest counterintuitively—and inconsistent with the results discussed above—that 
organisms with low working-memory capacity and rule maintenance deficits would be more 
responsive to uncertainty than high working-memory individuals. That is, the relationship 
between Stroop interference and responsiveness to uncertainty (Washburn et al., 2005) appears 
to be inconsistent with the remaining literature.  
One potential explanation for the discrepant findings of the Washburn et al. (2005) study 
is found in the psychophysical discrimination task. In the individual differences report, increased 
responsiveness to uncertainty was calculated as the amount of escape responses chosen within 
the individually determined region of uncertainty (Washburn et al., 2005). The threshold task (as 
described by Smith et. al., 1997) presented participants with 50% dense trials (2,950 pixels), 
36% probe trials, and 14% low-difficulty sparse trials (450 pixels). Probe trial difficulty titrated 
so that participants remained at chance accuracy in these trials. Thus, 86% of trials presented to 
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participants were either dense or nearly dense according to their individually determined 
perceptual ability, meaning participants usually remained in or near their objectively uncertain 
range. It seems possible that this manipulation, like the listwise manipulation of congruent-
proportion in Stroop tasks previously described (e.g., Hutchison, 2011; Kane & Engle, 2002), 
may serve to encourage escape responses for individuals who may otherwise be less likely to 
monitor task goals and subjective amounts of uncertainty (e.g., rhesus monkeys). The escape 
response in that task was not discouraged in any way, and was only costly in the time required to 
select the response. The features of the difficulty sampling and of the escape response in this task 
may have influenced the resulting correlation between uncertainty responsiveness and Stroop 
interference. Specifically, participants who otherwise may have been less responsive to 
uncertainty were cued by the continued presentation of difficult trials. This is one hypothesis that 
will be tested in the proposed experiment. 
1.3.2 Stroop Interference and Response Competition 
Alternatively, Washburn et al. (2005) proposed that the relationship between Stroop 
interference and uncertainty responding could be due to a degree of response competition 
common to both tasks. In the psychophysical discrimination task, participants are required to 
categorize stimuli based on a primary perceptual property. Competition between response 
options increases as differences between stimulus categories are narrowed. That is, participants 
are presented with increasingly ambiguous stimuli, requiring constant mediation of category 
representations (Shields et al., 1997), thus generating greater conflict between response options. 
Once competition between response categories reaches an individually determined uncertainty 
threshold, individuals will control behavior in the form of responding 'uncertain.' Individual 
differences in uncertainty responsiveness are not indicative of differences of monitoring per se, 
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but are instead indicative of differences in the sensitivity to competition experienced between 
primary responses.  
In the Stroop task, incongruent trials present response options in which the prepotent 
characteristic (e.g., color-word) conflicts with the focal response (e.g., font color). The 
competition between responses is responsible for generating interference within the incongruent 
trials (Posner & Snyder, 1975, as cited by Macleod, 1991). Resolution of this response 
competition is performed by a general executive-control mechanism (Engle, 2002; Kane & 
Engle, 2003), which is why individuals with relatively good executive-attention skills typically 
show less Stroop interference than those with poor capacity for executive-attention (attention 
control). This leads to the prediction that, if the correlation between uncertainty responding and 
Stroop interference is due to the response competition common to both tasks, then individual 
differences in sensitivity to response competition will interact with the relationship between 
interference effects and uncertainty responsiveness. 
Stroop interference effects have been shown to be related to the degree of semantic 
incongruity from the relevant to the irrelevant stimulus characteristic within trials (Klein, 1964; 
Washburn, 1994). In numerical Stroop, for example, interference effects increase according to 
the symbolic difference of numerals contained within arrays (Washburn, 1994). That is, 
participants required significantly more time to respond and tended to make more errors when 
the values within the incorrect array of the incongruent trial are greater (e.g., incongruous arrays 
of 6s vs. 2s generate longer response latencies than arrays of 3s vs. 2s). Increased interference at 
higher levels of semantic incongruity is caused by differences in associative strengths. Numerical 
symbols of larger values such as 8s or 9s are more strongly associated with “greater” than 
smaller-value numerical symbols such as 3s or 4s and, thus, produce greater conflict. Efficient 
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resolution of incongruity at higher levels of interference requires greater control of executive 
attention. Consequently, both Stroop interference and the symbolic incongruity effect are 
amplified in rhesus monkeys when compared to humans. 
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2 EXPERIMENT 
Individuals who experience more Stroop interference effects are more responsive to 
uncertainty (Washburn et al., 2005). This result appears to be inconsistent with the previously 
summarized literature. One account of the Stroop effect attributes interference to the requirement 
of per-trial resolution of response competition and across-trial maintenance of task goals or rule 
(Kane & Engle, 2003). The purpose of the current study was to determine the contribution of 
individual differences in sensitivity to response competition and rule maintenance ability to the 
previously reported relation between Stroop interference and uncertainty responsiveness. Section 
heading 
2.1 Method 
2.1.1 Participants 
Three groups of undergraduate participants (total n = 209) were recruited and completed 
a numerical Stroop task and a psychophysical uncertainty task. Demographic data were not 
collected for these volunteers, but it seems likely that the sample reflected the typical distribution 
of the undergraduate participant pool (approximately 59% female and 41% male, 40.8% African 
American, 28.8% White, 11.6% Asian, and 9.3% Hispanic/Latino). The groups are described 
below. Participants were assigned class credit for taking part in the study. 
2.1.2 Stroop Task 
Participants completed 400 trials of a computerized numerical Stroop task similar to the 
one described by Washburn (1994). Participants were required to perform a trial-initiation 
response at the start of every trial. A cursor was presented below the center of the screen with a 
circle icon directly above it. Participants pressed the up arrow key to place the cursor over the 
circle to begin the trial. In each test trial, two arrays of characters were presented on the screen, 
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one array to the right and one to the left of the cursor located at the center. Each array was 
composed of one to seven characters. Participants were instructed to select as quickly and as 
accurately as possible the array of stimuli that contained the largest number of items. Participants 
chose arrays by using the arrow keys to move the cursor over one of the two arrays. Baseline 
trials were comprised of arrays containing letters (A, B, C, or D). The other two trial types used 
Arabic numerals instead of letters in the array. Congruent trials consisted of larger arrays 
containing numerals with greater value and smaller arrays containing numerals with lesser value 
(e.g., five 3s vs. two 0s). Incongruent trials consisted of larger arrays containing numerals with 
lesser value and smaller arrays containing numerals with greater value (e.g., seven 1s vs. six 2s. 
Numerical-symbol differences (the difference between the numerals contained in each array) 
ranged from 1 to 5. Array size differences (the difference between the number of items in each 
array) also ranged from 1 to 5. Correct responses were indicated by a tone. Incorrect responses 
were indicated by a buzz and a 2-second timeout. 
 
Figure 1 Sample Baseline Numerical Stroop Trial 
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Figure 2 Sample Incongruent Numerical Stroop Trial 
 
 
Figure 3 Sample Congruent Numerical Stroop Trial 
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The Stroop task was divided into two counterbalanced blocks. In one block, participants 
were presented with 250 trials of 80% congruent trials and 20% incongruent trials, resulting in 
about 200 congruent trials and 50 incongruent trials. In the other block, Stroop trial types were 
randomized for 150 trials, resulting in about 50 congruent trials, 50 incongruent trials, and 50 
baseline trials. Symbolic incongruity differences were randomized. 
The testing software recorded the trial type and difference between numerical arrays per 
trial. Participant accuracy and response times were recorded. Response times were filtered 
according to a priori assumptions of task performance; Responses under 200 ms and over 2000 
ms were removed as being either too fast or too slow to indicate a valid trial attempt. 
Note that the previous correlational study (Washburn et al., 2005) used a classic color-
word Stroop task, whereas the numerical Stroop task was employed here to allow for a relatively 
simple, linear tracking of degrees of interference presented by the stimuli in each trial. That is, 
every incongruous Stroop trial generates response competition between cues, but the degree of 
competition is likely not equivalent across incongruous trials. Symbolic differences between 
arrays in a numerical Stroop task are more easily quantifiable than perceptual differences 
between colors and color-words on incongruous Stroop trials. For example, four 7s versus five 2s 
is a symbolic distance of 5, whereas four 7s versus five 6s is a symbolic distance of 1; however, 
it is unclear how to measure the relative differences of BLUE printed in red compared to 
GREEN printed in red. Thus, the numerical Stoop task yielded predictions and analyses that 
were more straightforward.  
2.1.3 Uncertainty Task 
Participants completed 500 trials of a psychophysical discrimination task similar to the 
original continuous-stimuli uncertainty task described by Smith et al. (1997), but using updated 
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parameters (e.g., Coutinho et al., 2015). Though the Washburn et al. (2005) correlational study 
used a psychophysical threshold task, the symmetrical-category discrimination method was 
employed here to allow for a more modest oversampling of the difficult range.  
Participants were required to perform a trial initiation response at the start of each trial. A 
cursor was presented below the center of the screen with a 200 x 100 pixel space at the center of 
the screen. The frame was filled with a variable number of illuminated pixels scattered randomly 
within this space. Participants pressed the up arrow key to touch the cursor to the frame to begin 
the trial. The number of illuminated pixels spanned across 42 levels of trial difficulty, with each 
level containing 1.8% more illuminated pixels than the last. Pixel densities were calculated using 
the following formula, rounded to the nearest whole number: 1,066 x 1.018t where t is equal to 
the trial step variable. Level 1, for example, consisted of 1,085 illuminated pixels. Level 42 
contained 2,255 pixels.  
Participants were required to respond “sparse” on trial densities 1 through 21 by using the 
arrow keys to move the cursor to an “S” symbol, and “dense” from trial densities 22 through 42 
using the arrow keys to move the cursor to a “D” symbol. Participants were allowed to respond 
“uncertain” at any time by using the arrow keys to move the cursor to a question mark (“?”) 
symbol. Correct responses were indicated by a 0.5s ascending tone, and a 1-point increase in a 
counter displayed on-screen. Incorrect responses were indicated by a buzzer, a point penalty in 
the on-screen counter, and a timeout.  
27 
 
Figure 4 Sample Uncertainty Task Trial 
 
As noted above, three groups of volunteers were tested. Participants in Group 1 (n = 77) 
received a 1-point decrease and a 1-second timeout per incorrect response on the Uncertainty 
task. Participants in Group 2 (n = 58) received a 3-point decrease and a 3-second timeout per 
incorrect response. Participants in Group 3 (n = 80) received a 3-point decrease and an 8-second 
timeout per incorrect response. Irrespective of group, uncertain responses cleared the current trial 
and advanced to the next trial without points or penalty. Each trial level was chosen randomly 
from the density range regardless of response on the previous trial. 
2.2 Statistical Analysis 
Five scores were computed for each individual participant. Uncertainty responsiveness 
was calculated as the number of escape responses chosen within the center density range divided 
by the number of trials the individual completed within that range. Although participants may 
not have been equally uncertain within this density range, overall responsiveness to uncertainty 
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was captured within these middle density levels. Stroop interference was calculated as the 
difference between baseline trials from the randomized ratio block and incongruent response 
times in both the randomized and ratio blocks. A ratio difference score was computed as the 
difference between incongruent response time difference scores across blocks. A response 
competition score was computed for individuals as the difference in mean response times from 
high interference (arrays with a numerical difference of 5) to low (arrays with a numerical 
difference of 1). 
Initial analyses of each group’s data produced similar patterns of results for Group 2 and 
Group 3. These results closely resembled previously reported results for uncertainty 
responsiveness; consequently, Group 2 and Group 3 were combined for the results reported here.  
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3 RESULTS 
Means for response time on the Stroop task and escape ratio on the Uncertainty task are 
presented in Table 1. The numerical Stroop task produced Stroop-like interference: Participants 
required significantly more time to respond to incongruent trials than to baseline trials, t(133) = 
4.76, p < .001. Incongruent trials with high numerical differences across arrays required 
significantly longer response times than those with low numerical differences, t(132) = 3.15, p < 
.01. Finally, incongruent trials in the high-congruent-ratio block (with incongruent trials 
appearing less frequently) generated longer response times than those in the equal incongruent 
trial distribution block, t(133) = 2.14, p < .05.  
Table 1 Numerical Stroop Task Means 
 Baseline Incongrue
nt 
Low 
Difference 
High 
Difference 
Rule 
Maintenance 
Ratio 
Group 1 602.29ms, 
sd = 111.88 
613.97ms, 
sd = 111.78 
610.74
ms, sd = 
109.35 
627.11m
s, sd = 
131.35 
617.51ms
, sd = 128.89 
Group 2 615.20ms, 
sd = 93.38 
630.89ms, 
sd = 96.05 
626.70
ms, sd = 
94.51 
646.53m
s, sd = 
122.06 
636.40ms
, sd = 119.23 
Group 3 596.29ms, 
sd = 98.04 
615.91ms, 
sd = 98.79 
612.32
ms, sd = 
99.45 
630.13m
s, sd = 
106.53 
638.89ms
, sd = 150.66 
Group 2 & 604.5ms, 622.4ms, 618.5m 637.2ms 637.8ms, 
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3 sd = 96.15 sd = 97.53 s, sd = 97.24 , sd = 113.29 sd = 137.46 
Total 603.68ms, 
sd = 101.91 
619.32ms, 
sd = 102.78 
616.70
ms, sd = 
101.64 
633.48m
s, sd = 
120.01 
630.41ms
, sd = 134.44 
 
 
Figure 5 Numerical Stroop Interference Effect 
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Figure 6 Stroop Interference by Numerical Difference 
 
 
Figure 7 Stroop Interference by Difference Level 
 
The uncertainty task produced similar response rates to those reported in Washburn et al. 
(2005). Responsiveness ratios (i.e., the proportion of uncertain responses to total trials within the 
center-density levels) ranged from 0.00 to 0.83. The mean responsiveness ratio was 0.27 with a 
standard deviation of 0.23. In Washburn et al. (2005) the optimality of responsiveness to 
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uncertainty [ORU] measure ranged from 0.00 to 0.80, with a mean of 0.23 and a standard 
deviation of 0.21.  However, the correlation between Stroop interference and uncertainty 
responsiveness that was reported by Washburn et al. (2005) was not replicated in the present 
study. There was no significant relation between Stroop interference and uncertainty 
responsiveness, r(129) = 0.13, p = .14. Additionally, extreme-groups analysis using a tertile split 
on the basis of Stroop performance did not show a difference in uncertainty responsiveness 
between the best (difference score M = 0.21 ms) and worst (difference score M = 0.26 ms) 
performing participants in the Stroop task, t(78) = 1.02, p = 0.31.  
 
Table 2 Uncertainty Task Descriptives 
 Min Max Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Group 1 0.00 0.53 0.11 0.13 
Group 2 0.00 0.83 0.23 0.24 
Group 3 0.00 0.79 0.31 0.23 
Group 2 & 3 0.00 0.83 0.27 0.23 
Total 0.00 0.83 0.21 0.22 
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Figure 8 Uncertainty Task Responses by Density Level 
 
Given the absence of a significant correlation between performance on the Stroop and 
Uncertainty tasks, there was no mediation effect of response competition or rule maintenance on 
the relation between Stroop interference and responsiveness to uncertainty. Further, extreme-
groups analyses again failed to reveal significant differences: Participants who were more 
sensitive to differences in response competition were not more responsive to uncertainty than 
those who were less sensitive (M = 0.30 and M = 0.25 respectively), t(83) = 0.80, p = 0.43. 
Participants who were more capable of rule maintenance were not more responsive to 
uncertainty than those who were less capable (M = 0.25 and M = 0.23 respectively), t(85) = 0.46, 
p = 0.64. 
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4 CONCLUSIONS 
The results from this study were as expected in several important ways. The numerical 
Stroop task successfully reproduced a Stroop-like interference effect. Participants required 
significantly more time to respond to incongruent trials than to baseline trials. Higher levels of 
incongruence (larger symbolic differences across numerical arrays) also produced longer 
response times, as had been predicted. This suggests that variations in the level of response 
competition contributed to the amount of interference on each response. The ratio of congruent 
to incongruent trials also drove interference, such that participants required more time to respond 
to incongruent trials when they were presented less often. Additionally, the uncertainty task and 
analysis produced results similar to those reported in Washburn et al. (2005), in that participants 
used the uncertain response option appropriately (i.e., on those trials in which they were 
demonstrably uncertain). Despite these results that were consistent with hypotheses and with 
prior findings, the result of primary interest for this study was surprising and disappointing. No 
significant relation was found in this study between the Stroop interference and responsiveness 
to uncertainty. The present study was designed to explicate the finding reported by Washburn et 
al. (2005) that individuals who experienced greater levels of interference were also more likely 
to respond to uncertainty; however, this finding was not replicated, and thus not explained, in the 
current study.  
At least two explanations may be offered to account for the failure to replicate the 
previously reported relationship between Stroop interference and uncertainty responsiveness. 
First, a different Stroop task was used in the present study than by Washburn and collaborators 
(2005). If different variations of Stroop-like tasks all measure the common cognitive-control 
processes, as is typically assumed, then this change should not have affected the present findings; 
35 
however, it might have. Although the numerical Stroop task is capable of producing a Stroop-
like interference effect, as shown here, different tasks that generate Stroop-like interference tend 
not to intercorrelate highly (Salamanca & Washburn, in preparation). That is, individuals who 
perform well on the Stroop color-word task do not necessarily perform well on the numerical 
Stroop task. The previously reported relationship between Stroop interference and 
responsiveness to uncertainty (Washburn et. al, 2005) may, in fact, be only a relation between 
Stroop color-word interference and responsiveness to uncertainty. The Stroop color-word task, 
like the psychophysical discrimination task, is inherently a categorization task that requires 
participants to sort stimuli according to a primary perceptual property. The participants who were 
most impacted by interference in the Stroop color-word categorization trials were more 
responsive to uncertainty in the psychophysical categorization trials. This commonality may be 
central to the interpretation of the current result. In contrast, the numerical Stroop task involves a 
comparison between two sets. The relation with uncertainty may be lost by a Stroop-like task 
that involves comparison of two sets (vs. competition between two features—color and 
meaning—of a single word). This relationship would therefore not be apparent in the numerical 
Stroop task. A follow-up study would be required to determine whether uncertainty monitoring is 
uniquely correlated with some but not all Stroop-like tests. 
Second, it is possible that the difference in the overall difficulty of the uncertainty task 
promoted uncertain responses from a group of individuals distinct from that of the 
psychophysical threshold task previously used (Washburn et. al, 2005). To date, there is no 
existing research comparing individual uncertainty responsiveness in the continuous and 
threshold tasks. It may be that, like the inter-task differences in Stroop interference, different 
uncertainty tasks produce different levels of uncertainty responsiveness within individuals. If so, 
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the relationship between Stroop interference and uncertainty responsiveness may be related 
specifically to the difficulty of the uncertainty task used. This recalls one of the suggestions by 
Washburn and collaborators (2005) who speculated that the relationship may be due to the 
amount of uncertainty experienced due to associative strengths developed throughout the task. If 
participants begin to find the primary categorical options less favorable due to their being more 
greatly associated with penalties, they may be further encouraged to use the escape response on 
difficult trials beyond the difficulty of the primary discrimination. In other words, responses to 
trials of the same difficulty will be moderated by their associated likelihood of penalty. Because 
difficult trials were more frequent in the threshold task, participants were more likely to respond 
incorrectly and to face penalties. A similar effect was seen in the present data: Participants were 
more likely to use the uncertain response when the associated penalties were more aversive. The 
increase of task difficulty by increasing the amount of difficult trials has been previously used to 
encourage the use of the uncertain response (e.g., Beran et al., 2009). However, this does not 
suggest that the uncertain response is a conditioned response in itself. As previously discussed, 
several studies demonstrate the difference between the uncertain response and the primary 
categorical responses (e.g., Zakrzewski et al., 2014). This was also demonstrated in the current 
study where, despite differences in penalties, at least one participant in each group did not use 
the uncertain response at all. A future study could seek to increase the aversion to the primary 
response categories by increasing risk of incorrect answers with greater penalties.  
One of the limitations on the interpretability of the results is that the current study 
manipulated both tasks used. If, for instance, there was no relationship between a color-word 
Stroop task (the task originally used; Washburn et. al, 2005) and the uncertainty task with 
continuous stimuli, it could be assumed that the previously reported relationship was due to a 
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factor specific to the threshold uncertainty task. If there was no relationship between the 
numerical Stroop task and a threshold uncertainty task (the task originally used; Washburn et. al, 
2005), it could be assumed that the previously reported relationship was due to a factor specific 
to the color-word Stroop task. However, because both tasks were altered, it is not possible to 
determine which of the two tasks produced the discrepancy.  
Also inherent in these speculations is the possibility that the present results capture the real 
independence of uncertainty responsiveness and Stroop interference, and that the Washburn et al. 
(2005) results were spurious. However, the failure to replicate the previously reported relation in 
the current study is not sufficient to determine whether there truly is no relation between the two 
variables. Future research into the relationship between Stroop interference and uncertainty 
responsiveness should continue to examine the contribution of both response competition and 
rule maintenance ability in both tasks. Like the present study, manipulations in the amount of 
conflict experienced in both the Stroop task can be used to quantify sensitivity to response 
competition, with the added manipulation of increased task difficulty in the uncertainty task to 
measure the potential effects of this sensitivity across tasks. For rule maintenance, future 
investigations could include other measures of the capacity, including operation-span or other 
measures of working memory. 
The current study was designed to replicate a previously reported relation between Stroop 
interference and uncertainty responsiveness. Although this was unsuccessful, the results 
produced in the current study provide guidance for future investigations into individual 
differences in metacognitive task performance.  
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